

HAPPENING OVER AGAIN OR TRANSACTING VARIOUSLY? A NEW MOUNT SINAI FOR US SECURITY REMOUNT IN THE PACIFIC?

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Abstract

How undecided are analysts about US foreign policy dilemmas? We can sincerely answer that no symptom of dissatisfaction, or of expressing reasoned pundit-like arguments, can equate with lack of decision about US foreign policy dilemmas.

No harsh or mild examiner hesitates to identify them, as they are still suggesting a consciousness of an important position in world politics. Throughout this article, we render two different woodcuts of US foreign policy in connection to the Pacific – the engravings of politics and of security, in relation to Pacific issues.

The workmanship of our argumentative system will focus on the structures of US presence in the Pacific, through the Cold War-originated hub and-spokes model, and on the presaged US return to the Pacific, of the current uncovering of events.

Our analyses will not be consolidated on the verbal activity of US journey back to the Pacific. We will not even assess the two periods, by the abstraction of contrarities between the two of them.

Some counterpoint traits can be perceived with the limpidity of a photographic negative.

Our graspable analytical purpose is to detect the idiosyncrasies of each period and establish whether a discontinuity avoidance can be espied between the two periods and whether the fact that the charge for the Pacific pursuit of US foreign policy is really an afresh one.

Keywords: Hub-and-Spokes Security Model, US Pacific Foreign Policy, US Pacific Return, Pacific Multilateralism, Pacific Bi-Multilateralism.

THE HUB-AND-SPOKES SECURITY MODEL. THE UNITED STATES` MIEN OF RESIDENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC – A DISENFRANCHISED BARD IN THE COLD WAR?

How tantalizing of a theme for the United States` (US) foreign policy has the Pacific represented, so that its representations are still smudging strong impressions upon US current standing in Pacific? It seems to be a theme of a research interest that needs to be treated with all the biometrics attentiveness entailed.

An extended description would not only focus on the investigations regarding how US has been able to portray itself as an actor with a mission within

the Pacific Affairs. An exhaustive coverage would have to make US intentions readable, from all the standpoints necessary to be flirted with intense discussions.

Is, in the case of US Pacific policies, the interaction between a culture clash and the creativity of relocation, tragic or has it ever been this way?

We will, in this section of this article, to relinquish a personal editorial-like presentation of how US pored into a meaningful focalization the Pacific and the strategic position it presented¹.

The fact that US was the directrix between the corresponding lines of post-war reconstruction in Europe stands uncontested. The enhanced rapprochement between Europe and US was much more than a cold calculus made on profit-gaining. Europe has always laid at the conic section of US interests in terms of global strategy and trade portfolio².

Furthermore, Europe represented what the ill-grace of potentiality of Asia could not be able to offer: a common civilizational and cultural past. The peculiar detachment of US policies from what the Old Continent stood for were the workings of an actor trying to disperse globally its prodigious talents and the Olympian efforts of surpassing the common matters of importance in world politics, by bringing in a new one.

In magnitude and rank of importance, US, however, could always find special connections of interaction and special occasions to build bridges between gaps of perception.

This commendable force of verifying did not surpass noteworthy advantages, in the case of the Asian continent.

If Europe could have, at its disposal, the exceptional attribute of the historical memory to construct anew structures with, Asia did not preset the same bid for attention.

Asia could not at all emit relations with the US, agreeing in the same quality and value that Europe could. As Cristopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein underline, US officials feared that Asia did not have the same proficiency striking effect that European actors have in order to contain the emergence of threats and impede their proliferation.

Moreover, US felt that the intending results of interactions with Europe have managed to create a status for US to feel like an adjunct part of the same class as the European actors: “U.S. policymakers believed that the United States was a

¹***The strategic position***, that the Pacific had, was very present in the shifting activities of US optical range of foreign policy, even before the Cold War. ***The battles of the Pacific*** underlined a maximum clarity for US energy and attention to converge in the case of the foci of ***the Pacific policies***; The question was now if this ***reassured refraction*** will be maintained, at least in the same dozes as it did, during World War II and the pre-World War II US policies.

²How could US lose a powerful ally and a corresponding marketplace for its products? Certainly, US needed trade partners that would appreciate the quality of US products and that would be able to pay a just amount for such a quality; In this regard, the Asian states could not have been prospective trade partners in the manner that the European states were and had the inactive coordinates of rebecoming the same; From the two categories of selection, Europe, even after it was torn apart by the debacles of World War II, represented a more serious and a more resilient alternative.

natural part of the North Atlantic community but that Southeast Asia was part of an alien political community. This difference helped drive the U.S. government to adopt divergent policies in two regions that, far from being natural, were constructed politically only in the 1940s” (HEMMER, KATZENSTEIN: 2002).

Hemmer and Katzenstein point out the fact that, for US, Asia was an inhabitant of a warring instability, an environment where multilateral frameworks were not capable of cogency.

The European strategic environment, was much more puissant for the objective of introducing of versatile forums for common defense.

US imagined that its investments in the egression of common institutions for

Europe will be less expensive than the endeavor to market its defense services in Asia and explore opportunities of likewise investments there.

US felt very much like saving a kindred spirit and a phratry relation of security, when it decided to thoroughly beleaguer large sums of money in the re-making of Europe and chose the bilateral lattice of interactions with the Asian states, that were not that far away from the gross tonnage of its political imaginary³.

After World War II, the US had all the likelihood lighten up that no actor before had. Thus, it could turn into a gutsy individualist or it could turn into an actor that was defender of its in-created *political imaginary*, and that selected partners for interaction that roam into the same embryotomy.

The road of cooperation between US and Europe was more length-wise than the one between US and Asia. As a backwash, US did not propose a portent security alliance for Asia, as it did in the case of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The resulting bilateral relations that US envisioned for the Pacific parts of Asia, made it possible for US to penetrate the continent, with a very favorable luggage. By and large, US pretty much used the bilateral system of engagement in Asia, after World War II, within the experimental conditions of a hub and spokes model.

This model found the force of practice of bilateral engagements to be the insuperable element to be used in order to secure advantages in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific.

It was not a strange courtship that US used!

It was more of a shaft of acting devices that US secured at its disposal through precise bilateral relations, as David Shambaugh makes comprehensible: “The alliance system is commonly referred to as *the hub and spokes model*, with the United States serving as the hub of a wheel and with each of the five bilateral

³ We delegate the use of the syntagm of *political imaginary*, within the following infrastructure of meaning: *a vehemence of association between ideas and symbols, that two or more actors parcel kindred allotments from.*

alliances (Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand) serving as the spokes.

The system has benefited the United States and its Asian allies for more than five decades and has been the primary regional security architecture since the end of the Vietnam War.

It has been central to the maintenance of strategic stability and economic development throughout East Asia. Even China has benefited from the security and stability engendered by the system, which has provided an environment conducive to China's recent explosive economic development" (SHAMBAUGH: 2006).

The most ramshackle perspective of the sequential fall of instability was Northeast Asia. US lapsed into the most inflated involvement in post-war reconstruction in Asia, in Japan.

With the expulsion of the Nationalists by the Communists in China and the irresolute mutability of the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the obvious place of action that US had to pin down was Japan.

Besides this, the emergence of rancorous and ill-tempered Japanese nationalism in Japan, after the humiliations it suffered in World War II, would create a hotbed of strategic vacillations that US could no longer contain.

Northeast Asia was the target of US outright implication, due to the fickleness of the conditions under which it developed after World War II. In Japan, US managed to impose a custom, balanced model of democracy, with very few endogenous elements and a subordinates of imposed ones⁴.

Japan had to face the development of extraneous realities and US, despite the fact that its power to act in Japan was untraced by counteractions⁵, had boundless prerogatives. Monarchical re-enactment was dealt away with, turning the monarch into a figure head with particularly limited political control.

No-one can deny that Japan and the resurgence of its militarism created a world of fear, as far as US was concerned. US did not abstain from taking all the forethought and guardedness necessary in the attempt to prevent the painting of such a dramatic picture.

By the time of 1951, when the Treaty of San Francisco received final drafting and re-sketching, Japan was no longer seen as a potential elusive enemy for US' interests in the Pacific.

⁴The editing of the Japanese Constitution, the pneumatic institutional consonants of the domestic political arena, the piers of civil rights and liberties, which were now awarded to be exercised freely, did not publicly express the will and the demands of the Japanese citizens.

As well, the total demilitarization of Japanese military did not concoct beneficial upshots to the stableness of Northeast Asia.

The occupying forces realized that a total demobilization would equal to burden-adding for the American defense forces, a realization that took over during *the Korean War of 1950-1953*.

⁵ We have to remember tht US was assisted by an Allied Council, made up of: Great Britain, The Soviet Union and The Republic of China.

The Allied Council offered very little external arbitration of what US could do and how it could act in Japan. More or less, US influence in Japan reigned supreme.

Unwittingly, it was transformed in an ally! In no less than five years, Japan was erased as a threat. It was a feat for US policy and strategy! With befitting respect for reason and strategic calculus, US over-concentrated its efforts in a war-torn Japan that had no seemly resources to re-become what it had been during World War II. With all proper reserves, a new national identity was created for Japan⁶!

The closeness that Australia shared with Southeast Asia – that quickly became after the war in Korea – the most fickle and erratic sub-region in terms of stability and the belittled military muscle of Great Britain made Australia look to US as a salvaging anchor against the spillover of incurring security loss and impending danger.

We can doubtfully say that Australia has held the same satellitary position that Japan had in the hub and spokes model of regional alliances. Australia look to US in an exploratory manner – no security hazard could have been endangered by such a exploration and no alternative advantages were lost on the way.

Except from being the only choice for Australia, security-wise, US was received as a security partner, not only with strategic anxiety and interest⁷, but also with desirable salutation.

Subservience is over-stated in some studies – as a continuance of character and quality in Australia's foreign policy towards US⁸.

Before the formal agreements of post-World War II conjured the superpower status, that US had acquired in world politics, Australia aimed at US as the highest staker in the unravelling of the warfare. By way of custom, Australia's links with Great Britain could never have been obstructed.

However, they gradually started to pale in substance, after Australia realized that the fate of World War II depended on the entrance of US in the hostilities. As David Maclean acknowledges, the fastener between Australia and US is matter of hope perpetuation, from the part of Australia:

⁶ Reproachably, it seems that the British were not able to achieve that much in the former Southeast Asian colonies, despite the fact that occupation was longer and long-drawn-out, in some cases, after World War II.

The legacy of the British administrative system laid down the lines and angles of one of *the weightiest heirlooms of the British colonialism*.

Some of the political instruments- like the constitutional design- gained some stirring vitality. Yet, *localism* was able to survive and flourish alongside *the cvasi-creative thinking*, that *British colonialism* was able to muster in Southeast Asia.

We call it *cvasi-creative*, as evidences of *British colonial foray* are not extrinsic from the realities, that were triggered after World War II. Long-standing positive influences of *British colonialism* existed, though, in Southeast Asia.

⁷ With regard to the situation unveiling at the time in Southeast Asia.

⁸ Sah Haydiyatan Ismail discusses, for instance, in his Phd. Thesis, the cringing submissiveness that Australia encountered in the alliance agreements in which it was placed, together with US. He states that US unilaterally planned to take care of the destabilizing issues in Indochina and did not actually regard Australia as *an equal assessor of problematic situation*.

„Such continuity is easily overlooked if the creation of *ANZUS* is interpreted simply in the light of Australian preoccupations of 1950-51 and subsequent years: a resurgence of Japanese militarism, Chinese communist expansionism, Indonesian designs on West New Guinea. Viewed in this way, it is easy to mistake the negotiation of *ANZUS* as heralding the dawn of a new era in Australian foreign relations.

Yet, seen in broad perspective, *ANZUS* represented the realisation of long-standing hopes by Australian political leaders of drawing the US into Australia's defence” (MCLEAN: 2006) .

After World War II, US wanted to pivot an enhanced presence in the Asia-Pacific region, by partaking at the plastering of two alliances: *the ANZUS* and *SEATO*. Australia participated in both of them, as an ally and strategic partner of US.

In September 1951, The Security Treaty Australia-New Zealand and United States was signed. Its foundation was hailed with relied trust for the future, in both Australia and New Zealand.

In essence, the provisions of the treaty did not promise much for Australia and New Zealand. According to Article III of *the ANZUS* Treaty: „The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific”(THE *ANZUS* TREATY, 2014) .

In the interim, another security treaty envisioned the creation of another pact. This time the pact was known, under the denomination of Manilla Pact. In 1954, under the prescripts of the Manilla Pact, The Southeast Asian Organization Treaty - or *SEATO*- was formed. Australia, together with: France, New Zealand, Pakistan⁹, Phillipines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Only two actors were actually adjacent to the territorial circumference of Southeast Asia, namely: Thailand and Philipines. For United Kingdom, *SEATO* was a more entertaining channel to exert influence on its Southeast Asian colonies. It did so until independence was formally conferred to them. With hindsight, United Kingdom would prove to be a more prime mover for the politics and its hold of control of the old colonies.

After the idea of *SEATO* did not request so much attractiveness for the participating countries, in 1971, The Five Power Defense Arrangements were shaped into configuration, with the participating tenancy of: United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. The unconditional commitment for defense, under the purveyance of the Anglo-Malay Defence Arrangements came to a concluding end in 1967¹⁰.

The Five Power Defense Arrangement was an act of reimposing a British censorship against perpetrators of the two Southeast Asian States. Analogically, its scope had to be panoptic, so as a string of relevance to be kept.

⁹With *the territorial assimilation of Bangladesh*.

¹⁰As a result of the *United Kingdom's East Suez Withdrawal*.

This motivation – of a must-have aptness of consequence for the wider are of the Asia-Pacific region, but at the same, keeping a restricted participation of only actors in close association with the established foundational accessibles – made The Five Power Defense Arrangements reported to lastingness.

The US interest in SEATO gradually subsided! No normative attachment towards the organization was ever empathied with, by the member states. *SEATO* auto-dissolved in 1977.

Notwithstanding this, the fact of pursuit and interestingness loss, from the part of US, must not be discomfit for a loss of US interest in Australia.

The bilateral relation between Australia and US was thrown into new heights of refining. Australia, for US, was a strategic teaser in the systemic balancing of the Cold War.

US, for Australia, shared the same concern for the same strategic enigmas of the Asia-Pacific region and the gist of strategic culture.

One of the most disconcerting aspect for Australia (yet not the only one!) was the difference in capabilities and the oversized tenancy that the US had within this regard.

As Mark Beeson reasons: „Since the Second World War, relations with the United States have assumed an increasingly prominent position in the construction of economic and security policies in Australia. Sentiment toward the US, both on the part of policy-making elites and within the wider public, has generally been positive, and the bilateral relationship, especially its strategic component, has enjoyed strong support across most of the domestic political spectrum” (BEESON: 2003).

As Beeson argues, within the rest of his study, space for quibble was able to originate¹¹.

By contrast to this partially low-rated obstruction, the relation between US and Australia was generally geared in a well-disposed and well-grounded manner.

Generally, the relation between US and Australia was one US special relationships during the Cold War.

Douglas Stuart and Jeffrey McCausland call it, in their study, the other special relationship that US had, beyond the potent transatlantic relation with the United Kingdom¹².

US is not seen as disengaged in sensible displays from its relation to Australia. It is, moreover, prevailed by a historical, strategical and cultural inveigling to entreaty this relationship in deeper betterment, given the newly developing tortousness of the Pacific strategic environment.

The knotiness of US relation with South Korea began almost immediately after World War II. The invasion of South Korea, by North Korea, in an attempt to recreate unity, sparked off in 1950 the Korean War.

¹¹The unappreciativeness that US showed Australia, regarding Australia`s efforts in the fight against terrorism, was one of the blemishes in this bilateral relation, that has surged after the Cold War.

¹²Which was not fathomed with focus and attention, within the large array of studies concerning US strategic relations, according to the two authors.

The lopsided differences in capabilities showed that US interference could not have been dismissed.

Like the other bilateral relations discussed before, action and words bolstered to the same degree, at least in the inception phases. US gave South Korea a reward incommensurate to its efforts during the war, after the Korean War was officially declared over. In 1953, South Korea became a treaty ally of US, by the signing of The Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and US in 1953.

If ever an attack upon South Korea will be inflicted, US would have an unconstrained and legal franchise to intervene and act within the limits of the defense required.

The latitude of the dispositions of this treaty was directed against North Korea and any future possible assaying to seek reunification¹³.

It was clear, from the standpoint of South Korea that the right shoulder to cry on was heedfully chosen. Cementing another ally in Northeast Asia, except for Japan, was pressing for US, also. Gradually, six-party talks were starting to be deliberated with North Korea, also¹⁴.

In this relationship, no objectionable causes for discontinuity were ever fluxed in by the two parties. Nevertheless, for US, the same strategic tie-in with South Korea, that the relations with Japan had, and, especially the ones shared with, Australia was not portioned out.

Measures to propel South Korea's economic development were, nonetheless, taken by US.

South Korea became part of the stock certificate of relations that US animated during the Cold War. South Korea was taken in the charge of family of US allies, due primarily to the overload of complexity in the Korean Peninsula.

Combined with the after-effect of protecting an already transformed ally – Japan – South Korea was merged in, by the indissoluble connection with US. South Korea was one of the most complicated allies from *the hub-and-spokes alliance model*, propelled by US.

By mere interpretation of facts, the premises of its implied engagement in burden-sharing were few, the demands for US assistance in protection and development-fomenting were exceedingly multiple and diverse. South Korea was part of an area already secured by US.

¹³ Back then, this possibility was thought to be afflicted by high temptations from the part of North Korea.

An attack was thought to be quite repercussive and prone to productivity in the near future. US was not able to project *the same guidelines for post-conflict reconstruction in the Korean Peninsula*, as it was able to do in Japan.

At the time, US mindfulness was also directed to *The First Indochina Conflict*, that was unfolding in Southeast Asia. Concurrent conflicts and quasi-unassorted causes marked the Pacific in the early 1950's, as affording no reassurance for stability. US threw itself in the high in the Pacific during that time.

¹⁴ As a double initiative, from the part of South Korea and US also; It was again a question of fitness of time and place, for US, that, again could not be missed.

If it had not been for the Northern tip of the Korean Peninsula, for whom US was not able to conclude a scoring agreement, it is unlikely that US would have triggered the affreightment of investments that it did, at starters, for South Korea`s economic progress.

But, extreme supposition about US reluctance to look at South Korea as a partner must not be made. The situation in China, combined with the geographical contiguity of the Korean Peninsula to USSR, would have made a case for South Korea`s inclusion in the hub-and-spokes model.

Reluctance is too harsh a word to be used, as far as the decision of inclusion in the hub-and-spokes model goes. South Korea was a piece of inscrutability, that had to be chosen for special qualifications, even if these were not cultural consequences¹⁵.

Thailand and Phillipines were also culled in by preference in *the hub-and-spokes*. There is some contrariety in approaching these two states altogether, though.

Thailand and Phillipines differ very much in the way they understood their bilateral relation with the US in the way they prompted obedience for US policies and policy objectives in Southeast Asia.

Like Phillipines, Thailand was incorporated into a design of interaction, that suited US. Unlike Phillipines, Thailand understood that such a recipee should be applied with other states, too.

Thailand recognized and sympathized with the fact of enlarging the gaudery of bilateral relations that it had to develop.

Thailand was located in the centre of the much discommoded Indochinese Peninsula. If geography did not lavish Thailand with manifold opportunities, Thailand adopted a multiple attestation diplomacy. In the frequency of division of the bilateral relations a state had, Thailand chose to identify multiple friends and as rare and sparse enemies as possible.

The security relation that Thailand had with US was programmed to be recollective and prospicient.

In 1954, Thailand adhered to the status of being *a US treaty ally*, enclosing a formal security relation, into the point of duration. As Daniel Fineman asserts: „From the end of World War II to 1950, Thai foreign policy was based on the principle that one should make as many friends as possible, but not get too cozy with no one.

In the immediate postwar years, the Thais worked intimately with Britain in the commercial sphere but resisted London's proposals for closer military cooperation. They courted French favor but played host to thousands of Indochinese insurgents.

And though the Thais sought out American aid and diplomatic support, they maintained proper relations with the Soviet Union. Thai policy toward the

¹⁵ The highest grade for cultural consequences was shared, in the relation to US.

Western attempt to contain Communism in Southeast Asia, as Stanton described it in 1949, was to "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds" (FINEMAN: 1997).

Thailand, without doubt, was able to serve its role as a US ally. But, in the lines of Thai diplomacy, bringing protection and security to a successful ending, meant not only enjoying the amends of insurance, offered by US.

Compared to Australia, for instance, that, during World War II and in the outward period that followed, pretty much hinged on US help and protection, despite having more reasons than Thailand to feel powerful and confident.

The after-glow period of US-Thailand relations will have to be perceived in the post-Cold War period, during the divesting period of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.

It was a time of extraordinary exposing of US absence of boldness to offer assistance in time of need. This is still remembered as a jarring event in the bilateral relations between US and Thailand¹⁶.

Gee up, it was very interesting to observe that during the Cold War, the negotiations that started did not follow dissolution, instead they prospered in subsequent cooperation.

Elementally, the relation between US and Thailand debuted in 1833, when the Treaty of Amity and Commerce was first signed.

No efforts of reconstruction were ever needed, in the future course of events to repair emerging separations of hurtful divisions. Yet, Thailand had a powerful emphasis to assume an omni-directional diplomacy, accomodating USSR, China and all sorts of different extra-regional actors that eyed Thailand for its potential as a partner.

Thailand stands apart for another noteworthy scarcity in Southeast Asia: it was never colonized. It retained this attribute, valued for its tenuity, during the Cold War also¹⁷, charging it with new roles and new directorates.

In the fluid and unpredictable puzzle, that represented the Cold War in Indochina, Thailand trusted its own power of judgement, yet it was not at all a self-directed state. Was it a masterless country?

No, influences on Thailand were disposed to reactive variability and were numerous in presence. Yet, what we can say about Thailand and, in the notable main, especially about its stature during the Cold War, opposite to the United States, is that Thailand was masterful.

¹⁶ US was seen as *an unrelenting partner*, morose and austere to the elements of Southeast Asian local culture, that made *the Asian Financial Crisis* a reality.

¹⁷ Thailand played *in all sorts of wheels*, yet with *absolute consecration into none*. This dilligence was striking for an Indochinese state that did not procure enough capabilities to ignore the making of partnerships.

The perseverance with which sought them, omni-directionally, is one of the major performance feats, that were reaped by Thailand, even during the Cold War.

The staging of *this omni-directional diplomacy* was changed. Comparatively, Thailand is also currently trended to swing as many anchors as it did in the past, as far *the structure of its bilateral partnerships* is concerned.

Philippines, compared to Thailand¹⁸, a matter of similarity is recognized by the fact that neither Philippines, nor Thailand acted in a self-directed fashion. Both manifested a ready accessibility to US` intended goals in their region. The withstanding contrast between the two is that Philippines seemed to exert more rights of conscience, from the position of US partner: both to benefit from and to assist to.

More than Thailand, Philippines was a proxy shareholder of US position in the Pacific and of its authority to act underneath this representation. The security relation between Philippines and Thailand was a contrivance, expressed in sketch and action. The relationship with Philippines proved the ponderous worth of the hub-and-spokes model.

On a historical background, the relationship between US and Philippines dates back from the XIXth century, when Spain was castigated by US, through an attack at its colonial possessions.

Eventually, US aggression against Spain craned a dilation for Philippines also. Philippines, like other Spanish colonial possessions, seized the opportunity to rebel against the lengthy Spanish colonial rule.

The most important avail of the American-Spanish War of 1898 was the fact that Philippines did not manage to overtake independence. Philippines` rebellion managed to create a rocade of dominion, US taking over Philippines. US proved to be an unlike colonial ruler. It did not have the voluntary leaning to acquire a boosted knowledge of how a colonial ruler should act like.

Sorrowful recollections about US colonial stay in Southeast Asia are not imparted strictly because of such a thing¹⁹.

Philippines-US relation was a relation between an old/ a current colony and a ruler, and US jettison of this situation was to treat Philippines like an ally, that lacked the requisite qualities to be equal.

¹⁸ Perhaps, this is not one of the most successful comparison to make, given the very different rank and size of standing of the two countries.

Philippines enjoyed *a more protected geographical position* from vulnerability and attack, than the one Thailand had, being situated in *the focal unveilings of one of the most wavering dodgy and exposed places*, during the Cold War: *the Indochinese Peninsula*.

Philippines was situated in maritime Southeast Asia, having been offered *some physical cloiture of protection*. Yet, Philippines was also faced with noxious and parlous security events during the Cold War and after.

Especially due to its open position in the South China Sea, Philippines experienced severe threatening from China. To this, were added inter-state touch-and-go moments with other Southeast Asian states.

One of these is *the North Borneo dispute* with Malaysia. We infixed this comparison to emphasis the manner in which *US presence* was furnished with support and trueness of course towards policy objectives.

¹⁹ Pointing out the main difference between *American* and *European colonialism* in Southeast Asia. *European colonialism* is, moreover, linked to a heinous behavioral aggravation than the American one, where exploitation was also used, but some local control was thought to be comely.

Before World War II, US treated Philippines like a doorway to regular and sufficient resources and to the Asian continent, as well. In the first years of the Cold War, more exactly, in 1951, the Mutual Defense Treaty between Philippines and US was signed²⁰.

Critics of the assumed posture as a US ally, that Philippines adhered to in 1951, thought that it would leave Philippines` independence totally detracted. Philippines` leaders at that time filled up the security blanket, that Philippines was sorely missing with the total engagement and strictly confined engagement with US, during the Cold War.

At first, the security relation between the two was designed to protect US ` interests against the Soviet ones in the region. More than that, it was a security relation ennobled with the heavy backstay of US` military bases in Philippines: a naval base in Subic Bay and an air base in Angeles, named Clark Air Base²¹.

Philippines` confirmed confidence on US protection was lessened in retaining solutions, according to the text of the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, that varnished the creation of the regional assembly: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (*ASEAN*).

The text of the Bangkok Declaration did not lay open for discussion the consequential matters of extraneous intervention on the exercise of local sovereignty. For this system of principles, the Bangkok Declaration accentuated: „AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development”(ASEAN DECLARATION: 2014) .

The short-lived nature engraved for the foreign military bases on Southeast Asian soil did not mention exactly how long is too much or too little. This ambiguity allowed Philippines to act plenteously in its security relation with the US, and interpret this norm with pliancy.

After all, at that time, Philippines was a founding signatory member of the Bangkok Declaration and it had to offer guarantees, that the not so easily shaped provisions of the Bangkok Declaration could not have been easily trespassed.

All the Southeast Asian states were veteran courtiers of the norm of sovereignty – a property of statehood, that was so toilsomely acquiesced in Southeast Asia.

Philippines, more than Thailand (the comparison we used for referential use), was much more unaccustomed to fend for its own interests. It was ready to be

²⁰*The politics of respectfulness and good intentions* was an *imperishable variable*, in the case of the *security relation between US and Philippines*.

The US-Philippines Treaty was displayed in purposes, imitated after *The Military Bases Agreement*, signed between Philippines and US *in 1947*.

²¹ Both military installations were kept in continuance throughout the Cold War, with Philippines` acceptance and uphold of reinforcement.

part of an alliance, that would allow it some form of security surety, combined with an important quota of sovereignty.

In a way, the security relationship between US and Philippines lacked mitigating elements and was managed in a resembling way, connected to the last years of US colonial power of office in Philippines.

The striking difference was that Philippines was not totally devoted to resource despoiling, from the part of the US, and that it was a sovereign country, exercising this attribute by rightfulness, not by fraud. The US-Philippines security relation is so indicative of the structural morphology of the Cold War²².

US and Philippines managed to share the stock of broader interests, in the ultimate period of the Cold War and until it began to show its characteristic patterns. US interfered forthwith in the internal issues of political stability in Philippines.

Particles of delay of such an interference were not issued at all!

In express terms, US showed Philippines pretty much a linear sequence of commitment, removing, throughout the Cold War period, any stringy part found on the way.

In 1991, the termination of the Base Agreement did not mean, that US started considering other bonds than quickness, when the situation in Philippines – external or internal- demanded it.

Like in the case of Japan, it was clear that the tight-bond petition was share-burdening – to the limits of discharging capabilities and capacities²³.

This meant that US was not at all interested to retain the conical top of maneuver and management in Philippines` domestic ruling and sanction, for the likes of internal and foreign policies, as well.

Philippines was not matched with the proper value of an equal ally. Nevertheless, it was not a junior-grade decider in matters of its own destiny and objectives, fitted to subservise to US demands, at any cost, or rate imagined.

A prostrate position was not considered atonal by the leaders of Philippines, even if it was not advantageous all the way, as Josef Yap imputes: „The Philippines has had a special relationship with the U.S., since the colonial period. This relationship is evident in the U.S.-centric nature of Philippine foreign policy.

The Philippines has always sided with the U.S. in key global issues. For instance, the Philippine Government sent troops uring the Korean War, cooperated with the U.S. during the Cold War, and provided logistical support during the Viet

²² By *structural morphology*, we mean: *the complex web of context, of relations between different entities residing in the international system, meant to influence and decide the faith of the composition of power relations.*

²³ Still, *share-burdening* was *a lechery* in the *US-Philippines bilateral relations*, even during the Cold War. Even when current excitements, by the development suffered in the *US-Philippines bilateral relations*, are showing, US pushes for more domestic responsibility conceding for Philippines and for the Philippines` authorities.

Nam war[...]Whether or not this foreign policy benefited the Philippines economically is a matter of debate.

Some argue that it is an unbalanced foreign policy, noting the adverse effects of the Philippines' involvement in recycling petrodollars in the 1970s.

The foreign debt of the Philippines ballooned during this period and the economy was dragged into the international debt crisis in the 1980s. Not surprisingly, no other East Asian economy suffered the same fate. The epicenter of the debt crisis was Latin America, where many countries shared the same U.S.-centric foreign policy" (YAP: 2013) .

Tout ensemble, US presence in the Pacific during the Cold War verifies, beyond any ounce of questioning, the claims and attitudes of *a distributional paradigm of power and bilateral relations*²⁴.

In this model, the interested Pacific states pooled their assets together in order to abstract as many benefits as possible from the interaction with US, that played the part of the wheel in this model.

Playing the role of the central wheel, US created for its foreign policy and military standing enough opportunities to change directions as if revolving on a pivot.

More than less, US, during the Cold War, was able to insert in the central axle of the mechanism a frame of interaction, which was meant to be regularly and flushly applied to all the bilateral relations in *the hub-and-spokes model*.

However, the design of the hub-and-spokes model did not serve to introduce what was unexpected. The unexpected and the unplanned was the fact that not all the states in *the hub-and-spokes model* took the security relation with the US in the same recognition of excellence and worth.

As we have pointed out, some countries appreciated the resolve for the challenges to their security as relying solely on the US. Others, on the contrary, had the accurate perception of searching, finding and of founding other means of ground of trust for the security issues they were facing.

The hub-and-spokes model was meant to operate as a model that could and that did create enough dependence and repose of mind, so that any alternative, pointing to the same outcome, could be released from the equation.

In this model, the elasticity of communication is diminished by the incurring interference and postulate location of the hub. Extraneously, it is very important to underline the fact that the only relation between the spokes is not given abutment, actually being removed from customary association.

The fact that the spokes are not encouraged to have any contact with each other is actually both disconforming and positive. It is positive, as this lack of relation actually embodies a heightened sense of dependency with the hub, but, at

²⁴ A syntagm used to describe the technicalities of functioning of *the hub-and-spokes model*.

the same time, the joining together for the sake of emphasis is given little recourse for action and a semitransparent ground for picture²⁵.

But, within this semitransparent ground for picture, the interests and ultimate objectives of the hub remain protected and focused towards enhancement. The spokes are left in a relative undesirable position, as their only pattern of communication is with the hub.

Unrelating with other spokes, can provide, in the long-term, destabilizing effects as far the inter-spokes relations are concerned. Summarising the main traits of US mien of residence in the Pacific, within the biodata provided by the hub-and-spokes model, we can mention the following:

□ ***The attaining of a comparable network²⁶ of engagement, to the one attributed to USSR;*** Pacific security was affected by the manifestations of the conflicts presented in this section;

The appeal of engagement of USSR in these conflicts produced no waver for US engagement; Clearly, it triggered it;

The factuality of USSR position in the different displays of Pacific security and the stretching security frameworks, that appeared were the germinative inducements for US involvement;

It was part of the internal logic of the Cold War, but it was not monomorphous throughout the whole period of the Cold War;

USSR succeeded in effectuating a strong net of bilateral relations, too; Vietnam²⁷, North Korea, China (before the Sino-Soviet interstice²⁸), targetting the economic potential of the South Pacific Islands – concluding, for instance, a trade agreement with Kiribati in 1985;

USSR range of selection for partners and for creating its own hub-and-spokes model was made flaccid by the fact that two alternatives of alliance were competing against these extortions: the one offered by US and the one offered by China's expansionistic designs; Certainly, ***the hub-and-spokes model***, that US elbow greased to put into application was more ambitious;

Like the engagements that USSR had in the region, ***the hub-and-spokes model*** was opposed by China and its string of partners, that procured a fair amount of success in the measurement against the ulterior designs for engagement;

□ ***The inconspicuous nature of the hub-and-spokes model*** as far as the interaction between the spokes was concerned; US was not interested in acclaiming close-knit relations between the spokes;

²⁵ We have utilized this expression to point out the fact that the encouraged scarcity of interaction between the spokes can create an invalidating effect for the mechanism.

The process of communication and interaction between ***the hub*** and ***one of the spokes*** is unknown by ***the other spokes***.

The restriction from the different processes of communication can breed distrust between ***the different spokes***; Moreover, it can breed also distrust towards ***the hub***.

²⁶ In its core representation, the ***hub-and-spokes model*** is a ***network model***, even if the intrinsic arrangements between its units, are of a limited capacity.

²⁷ Especially during ***the Third Indochina War***.

²⁸ Reaching the decisive highlight in 1971, with ***the Sino-American rapprochement***.

It rather the spokes knew little of the interaction that each had with the hub, so that no remote observation could create a situation of retraction of one of the hubs; Was US a reluctant guardian?;

US did not portray the image of the omnipotent superpower, able and willing to engage and forever seal the faith of different regional conflicts, unveiling around the world, without an assessment of the quantum of resources needed for this engagement;

In all terms of indexing, it was an abnormal strain of resources from US part to maintain such a involved presence through *the hub-and-spokes model*;

The War in Vietnam was a tendon pull, that marked a reserved engagement in Southeast Asian regional politics from then on;

Still, *the hub continued to wheel and put in motion its spokes*;

By maintaining this model and the inconspicuous nature of the level of interaction and of communication between the spokes of the model, US implemented an approach, based on the assumption that the actions of its allies were predictable and, at most, controllable;

However, countries engaged in such a model maintained some values of recreation from it; Thailand designated a differentiation and ripened close ties with China, within the same wave-length with the ones developed with the US;

US did not foresee the circumstance, which the spokes added to the regional Pacific mechanism, could become spokes for other mechanisms and be transformed into subscribers for the cartographic foundation of other forms of future hegemonism – like the Chinese one²⁹;

□ US was no strongly desirous for upgrading *the hub-and-spokes model*; No industrious desire for multilateral security frameworks to undergo conducive changes was delivered from US part;

Was it the fact that the Pacific actors were in a dire overview, as far as US was concerned?;

Could it only be a matter of gains contriving and only a focus of their adding up could be put forth? As Kai He and Feng Huiyun discourse the effort-gain exemplar image was the foremost paragon of motivation for the US: „Through setting the threat level as a reference point for leaders’ prospects of gains or losses, we suggest:

(1) high threats frame decision-makers in a domain of losses, and multilateral alliances become a favorable alliance choice because states are more likely to take the risk of constraining their freedom of action in return for more help from multiple allies as well as for avoiding further strategic losses;

(2) low threats position leaders in a domain of gains, and bilateral alliances win out because states are risk-averse in terms of maintaining their freedom of action in seeking security through alliances with fewer allies.

²⁹ It was a skepticism, nurtured for the degree of responsiveness, stationed for other actors, with *counter-paramount power designs for the Pacific*.

Thailand disappointed these expectations, by playing at both ends of the chord.

US alliance policy toward Asia after World War II is a within-case analysis that tests the validity of *the prospect-threat alliance model*" (HE, HUYUN: 2012).

Such a decision of engagement cannot be properly construed in all inflected forms of the word if not taking into account the particular discipline of identification in US foreign policy and the class of all the inter-laying items.

Within this note of exposition, Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, acknowledge the US disinterest for supporting multilateral security frameworks in Asia and in Southeast Asia, more specifically, as an inkling pointer of the lack of ideational sameness between US and the weighed in region:

„Starting with common rationalist explanations that focus on material capabilities and institutional efficiency to explain the forms of international cooperation, we add to them the important effect that *America's collective identity* had on the formulation of its foreign policy goals.

U.S. policymakers believed that the United States was a natural part of the North Atlantic community but that Southeast Asia was part of an alien political community" (HEMMER, KATZENSTEIN: 2002).

The momentum for mistrust reduction and also for the decreasing sense of alienness accompanied the hub-and-spokes model that US applied for the Asia-Pacific region.

The growing multilateral ambitions that the region started to divulge were not seen negatively, but they were not seen as a case-oriented motivation for involvement.

In distinction from this, US was not interested in the developing of *the hub-and-spokes model* into a multilateral constructional layout for security, into which US could play an equal role, in the same manner as the local actors.

This loom of policy of objectives was clearly unveiled in the case of *SEATO*, which we beared on explanations to, within this section.

In fact, the experience of *SEATO*, in the Asia-Pacific region, complicated the path to greater institutionalization in terms of extra-regional involvement in the multilateral security forums, that were further recrudesced.

On a balanced inspection, the hub-and-spokes model for the Asia-Pacific assumed the form of a sprain of resources from the part of US. It was non-linear in its dilligent efforts, with a summational involvement, depending on the vicinity to danger and/or conflict of a particular state, engaged in the model.

With germane disconsideration for the security multilateralism, that was surfacing in the Asia-Pacific region, it did not leave US a truly disenfranchised bard in the Cold War security details and occurences. Another consideration may be signed in this case!

US was not voiceless, but heedless in the implementation of the hub-and-spokes model, as it did not approach with forethought and thoroughness the concerned multilateral quality of security in the region.

US RETURN IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC SPACE – MALADJUSTED, FIERY OR TRANSITORILY ALREADY THERE?

US is definitely back in the Pacific! Or, at least, this is what some of the gaudiest studies imperatively announce. They claim that US is currently preparing and virtually setting in action a long-awaited comeback!

But how parallel have, in fact, been US policies reported to the Pacific so far? Geography, the sense of mastery that has accompanied US foreign policy so far, gave US the opportunity to develop partnerships with the actors residing in both the Atlantic and in the Pacific area.

Secondarily, as we have pointed out in the first section of this article, US projected ancillary its position in the Pacific.

It did this, as part of the internal logic of action that accompanied Cold War Politics and also, as part of the ascribing cumulus of distinguishable of factors, that made the Pacific and, most especially, the Asia-Pacific region a space of excessive relevance.

If a design was fabricated for the Atlantic Ocean, the same thing had to happen for the Pacific Ocean. Boldly, it is no case for intense debate that the geostrategic position of the Pacific Ocean has been rendered more conspicuous and has been carried forward by the inter-play of the different actors that the region entails and by their ace performance in world politics³⁰.

No congenerical correspondance could have been traced between the situation that of the Pacific and of the Atlantic residents after World War II. US appreciation for multilateralism confined its care to the Atlantic space. For the Asia-Pacific space, the hub-and-spokes model was provided with implements.

Supporting multilateralism, during the Cold War, was not beared a relationship with the standing connection of US involvement in the Pacific.

This left the measurable characteristics of the developing of multilateralism to the resident countries of the Pacific³¹. For the Pacific residents, multilateralism was an anew product line.

This was also confirmable for the Atlantic space! Comparingly, in the Atlantic space, the post-war debacle and damaging overthrow³², was able to show the resident countries that a pooling of resources, objectives and missions of reconstruction were preferable to the damaging influence of power politics.

Inter-state conflict resulted in destruction in both the Atlantic and in the Pacific. In the Atlantic, the resident actors more habituated with the exercise of sovereignty to understand that opportunities to practice it in its greater, conflated

³⁰ With respect to *the Southeast Asian tigers*, to China, Japan and even South Korea.

These actors engineered top-rate achievements in economic development and, also, in the manner in which they deposited emplacement towards *the global security architecture*.

With all these actors, US was able to grasp the harmonic changes of their policies and engage in relations, alliances or partnerships; Sometimes, these forms of engagement were combinedly used.

³¹ The inclusion of such supporting structures were designed timidly and their actual functioning was rather impeached by the different revelations of domestic politics.

³² At an unprecedented scale in its history.

dimensions of expansionism, colonialism and imperialism can season an irrecoverable state of devastation.

Notions of pooling and sharing of sovereignty seemed to be uttered in an easier, more open position. For the Pacific countries, the safety of anonymity as far as the exercise of sovereignty was concerned, did not prepare them for the immense millstones that such an exercise assumed.

After World War II, the courses demanded by the force of sovereignty exercise made the Pacific countries construe the answerableness of the situation of autonomy in sovereignty exercising, as one of the strictest clenches of statehood possibly envisioned³³.

For the Pacific countries, the whole situation, as it is protracted from the period of the Cold War, is a situation regarding the measurable well-handling of arising conflicts. Staving them off was a question of time and inter-state concordat of accomodation. Persisting unresolved issues – in the form of conflicts and latent territorial claims – are embodying reciprocal promises for the building of suitability of attention for the Pacific.

The structures of clenching sovereignty are still not decomposing. Yet, multilateral frameworks evolve for the security of the Asia-Pacific region, with ensuant simultaneity. *The Asia-Pacific Forum*, *ASEAN+3*³⁴, *the ASEAN Regional Forum* – are all forums of investigating elaborate set-up.

As Paul Dibb recounts, the Pacific was not part of undue immediate reimbursement of attention, as US did not feel part of the game, an intuitive look felt for other parts of the world³⁵:

„We need to recall too that *the United States is not an Asian power. It is a maritime power* that, if it is to have major influence in the region, must be able to project military power at great distances across the Pacific.

In the past, it has relied upon forward military bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, as well as from its own territories in Hawaii and Guam. Modern military technology is inevitably reducing US requirements in this regard.

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has argued that static military presence and mass, which has generally been taken as a measure of US political

³³ At first, this attitude turned to be technically perfect: the Pacific countries did not dat out of the shadows of conflict and instability after World War II.

Non-interference was not a mistaken impression of the strategic environment, under which their statehood had to develop.

Some of the Pacific countries- for the purpose of more instantiation – reckoning all of East Asia – during the Cold War – were *shifters to a pile of unsanctioned violence and forceful impetuosity* – mostly among each other, but also in relation to other extra-regional actors.

These highly-excited actions were destructive, yet, they became almost acceptable strategic-wise. The East Asian countries are still not gathering enough vehemence to precipitate a solution for all the frozen bilateral and multilateral conflicts in the region.

Some of them – due to the large-scale influence on *the overall Pacific security architecture* – are becoming entitled to more and more observance.

³⁴ Comprising *the ASEAN member countries*, together with: China, Japan and South Korea.

³⁵ With reference to *the Euro-Atlantic Area*.

commitment to Asia, is no substitute for the capability to rapidly deploy power: **Mass is interesting. Speed is even more interesting-** he proclaims” (DIBB: 2006).

Presently, US cannot afford to stick with the strategic universe of multilateral forums in the Asia-Pacific, that are now under construction. The past decade US foreign policy in the Pacific really missed this heartbeat.

Nevertheless, US was demoing a presence in the Pacific, tied down by geography and by the yielding of the bilateral relations of **the hub-and-spokes model**.

In more than one way, **the hub-and-spokes model** produces actual attendants for the Pacific security architecture.

It was not dirobed after the Cold War, as essentially no major changes were produced in its functional character. In the post-Cold War Era, US was biased and senseless regarding the assistance in community related matters in the Asia-Pacific security architecture.

In the theaters of military exercises, US forces were sweepingly integrated in the Asia-Pacific. US naturally gravitated towards an acquainted familiarity in the embellishment of its military presence in the Asia-Pacific³⁶.

US had the hankering to bolster this presence on the perception of solidarity-granting in crisis-solving and conflict-mangement. US military presence is flowchartedly deployed in operational state in: Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. From this perspectival prospect, US military presence is delineating shape-shifter objects.

The outlines of the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific are assuming more and more isometrical vagueness³⁷ regarding the evolution of bilateral and multilateral conflicts that were left in a steely state³⁸.

It is a new foundation bracing from which US cannot impair abrupt occurences. In 2011, US attempted at paying the first rightful homage to the forms of multilateralism existing in the Asia-Pacific region.

The sixth East Asia Summit³⁹, that took place in Bali, on 19th of November 2011 witnessed an impressive juncture of happenings. It bore witness to the deepening of the old and scarred Pacific bipolarity: China-U.S. and to the affirmative actions of other Pacific states.

³⁶ The old broach of perceiving **a strategic presence in the Pacific-** in the form of **alliances** and **military partnerships** – headed for the old variant as in the Cold War.

Only this time, military presence cannot operate in full effectiveness, if not decked out with other elements.

³⁷ A syntagm used with the sense that indexing for the nature of conflicts and for the prospects of the conflict-resolution cannot be arrived at, within the present concurence of variables.

³⁸ Territorial conflicts between different countries of the Asia-Pacific region, remain unresolved, after the vanquishing of **neocolonialism** or are being left unabatable by **the antiquarian provisions ofold security arrangements** – like in **the case of the Korean Peninsula**.

³⁹ According to the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 2005, East Asia Summit promotes the dialogue on a tripartite vein: politic, strategic and economic. Strong associations for all three easily transpired.

For U.S. and the Russian Federation, attending East Asia Summit was, in formal terms, a novelty. Under informal terms, both countries have been sloggerly, preparing for such an outcome.

On the one hand, the Russian Federation, through its territorial adjacency to the other East Asia states, played the energy ace of trumps beforehand, when in January 2011, the East Siberia Pacific Ocean project was inaugurated.

This dilligence is part of a masterplan to connect Russia`s territories in North Asia to the Korean Peninsula, Japan and China, attempting to make Russia`s remotest areas` economic situation improvable.

On the other hand, informed positively by the earlier events of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit, U.S. was committed to hand on the rites of its presence economically with the launching of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pre-announced in Hawaii.

It stands to reason, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that this is the geo-economic model that U.S. would try to contrive for Asia-Pacific.

This geo-economic model, on a Pacific stem, was meant to pervase in East Asian gantry, too⁴⁰. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an active trial, from the part of US, to perform extrinsically a more uplifted economic presence, in an unknown way for the Asia-Pacific region:

“The Trans-Pacific Partnership (*TPP*) is a proposed regional free trade agreement (*FTA*) being negotiated among the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam[...]

The TPP serves several strategic goals in U.S. trade policy. First, it is the leading trade policy initiative of the Obama Administration, and is a manifestation of the Administration`s pivot to Asia.

If concluded, it may serve to shape the economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region by harmonizing existing agreements with U.S. *FTA* partners, attracting new participants, and establishing regional rules on new policy issues facing the global economy—possibly providing impetus to future multilateral liberalization under the WTO” (FERGUSON, COOPER, JURENAS, WILLIAMS: 2013).

US wants to ennoble the forms of existing partnerships developed, under the patronage of the hub-and-spokes model with a more readable processor of multilateralism.

Disambiguation is necessary for such an endeavor: Will this readable processor mean that the posture of US-as the hub- is unchanged, or this position will remain unoccupied?

In our opinion, this is a more important question than the question of Sino-American strategic competition, applied in mythology for the next decade.

⁴⁰ During this East Asia Summit of 2011, China remonstrated against the improved American presence in the Southern extremity of Southeast Asia, that is to say, in Australia, despite the reassurances made by Prime-Minister Julia Gillard to the Chinese Prime-Minister Wen Jiabao.

Indeed, kith of coherence of US circuit of friends in the Pacific –old and new (as Vietnam became now part of the strategic picture, that travels the junction of US presence in the Pacific) – has scheduled the transportations of influential indications on the rise and potential onset of China`s presence in the Pacific.

U.S. pressures, on both the economic and security outposts, are thought, by many, to be part of a larger strategy of containing the rise and aggressiveness of China. But, in fact, President Barrack Obama stepped down from the hard, confrontational Bush approach towards China.

We have to admit that China is not the first act of relevance, when contemplating US return in the Pacific. US was never a genuine alien concerning Pacific issues, as other actors are⁴¹.

Interest for the Pacific was safely hidden under the branches of the validity criteria of the Cold War. During the aftermath of the Cold War, it was propelling towards a depressive side. It follows the modal logic of economic success and gradually-acquired global reputation of the Pacific countries. It is far more than containing China!

The common sense of comprehensive instruction tells us that US can utilize two systems of retroversion for enhancing its presence in the Pacific:

□ A redo recast of *the hub-and-spokes model*, with a Western normative evidence of authority;

This entails the underneath support for multilateralism, for a wide participation in the substantiating mechanisms of decision-making in the Pacific, through a normative laying stones;

However, the controlling principle of interaction, that will seal up US presence would still be bilateralism; That reason give, the selected pattern of interaction will be bi-multilateralism;

Partners and allies will have an ascending order of importance; This choice includes not only the adherence to human rights record coalescent issues, but also the peddling of connected ideation, through the popularization of free-trade likewise transcripts;

□ **Total de-activation of the hub position**; This would lead naturally to the result that concerns stringent enforcement of multilateralism⁴²;

Presumably, this would mean not only the spillover of Western normative foundations, but also giving affirmative reply to local generations of idea;

China would be kept entangled into such a full-sized model where normative interference will not be conflicting ;

⁴¹ With reference to the European Union.

⁴² An outcome that China strives to escape from; **Multilateralism** has never been China`s occasion of favourableness in interactions.

At least for this reason (but not only for this!), does US need to keep its policies mired into such decision-making: to avoid the arrays of decision where China can have *exclusive participation* (*exclusive meaning; minus US*) and to *entwine its policies closer to multilateral decision-making, so that their objectives would find new foundations for tolerance.*

As much as possible, China needs to be embroiled in Pacific multilateralism; US presence would have to recognize the characteristic relationship to conduct modeling of locality ideational items – a reciprocal play-by-the rules approach;

With everything considered, the paths of the US and of the Pacific countries cross in unpredictable ways. By all the means accounted, US return to the Pacific is not a return with respect to its inherent nature.

It is only a new accuracy of presence of regulation, that is neither maladjusted, nor transitorily exposed.

It is only designed, in more intensive insurance claims, that seem to be closer to the first option-picture we mentioned.

ARGUMENTATIVE ADJOURNMENTS

Sino-American challenging is only a minor odyssey of US return of the Pacific. US never had a complete monopoly in Pacific affairs and US has never left the policies for the Pacific free from its interference.

During the Cold War period, as we have shown, *the hub-and-spokes model* was being rendered under bewildering difficulty.

Despite this, its workings ensnared results! Peradventure, now the bewildering difficulty of presence-overhang is even harder! US has to comprehend the fact that presence-projection is acoustic and has to exercise close contact with this common knowledge, by not thinking in accord *to the hub-and-spokes rationaciation*.

US centrality in the Asia-Pacific architecture cannot be held in together without deviation. At first, this would be produced in a lesser mode, on the scales of errors!

Then, deviation will increment proportionately! There is a battery of negativism about its Pacific presence, that US needs to redress!

A total de-activation of the hub-position, as we have explained in the last section of this article, will have much more subordinaries for success! Albeit, it seems that now US is choosing the euphonic considerations of recasting *the hub-and-spokes model* under a redo for the Asia-Pacific security.

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